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1. Introduction 
In response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States (US) launched its 
military operation in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 called “Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF)”. This has already become the longest war in the history of the United 
States. According to the then U.S. President George W. Bush, “Our war on terror begins 
with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global 
reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” (Bush 2001) Bush declared that OEF was 
designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations. 
By late 2003, however, the Bush administration became more assertive in its 
efforts to institutionalize democracy in Afghanistan and began to expand its strategic 
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thinking and construct what became known as the ‘Freedom Agenda’ (FA) (Hassan and 
Hammond 2011: 511–532). This initiative was part of the wider US’ strategy to promote 
democracy in the wider region.  
Years later, on August 21, 2017, President Donald Trump, while announcing the US 
strategy for South Asia and Afghanistan said, “America will work with the Afghan 
government as long as we see determination and progress” (Trump 2017). Despite 
various plans and by different US administrations over the past years, Afghanistan still 
remains an unfinished project of the US’ foreign policy.  
The argument I present here explores why the US was not able to carry on a 
successful state-building agenda in Afghanistan. Although the US spent a huge amount of 
treasure and blood in the country to help to re-build state institutions and critical 
infrastructure, the miscalculation of and mistakes by US policy largely undermined the 
stated mission in Afghanistan. Thus, despite its military and diplomatic role in 
Afghanistan over the past nearly two decades, a number of factors are revealed in the 
paper that prevented the US to achieve its desired goals. Based on the literature review, 
the paper has evaluated the shortcomings of US policy in Afghanistan from the 
perspective of three major components of state-building i.e. Security and Peace; 
Democratization; and Reconstruction & Economic Development. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
State-building has several forms when it comes to the theories of International Relations, 
which include liberal, neoliberal, democratic, humanitarian, etc., however, in general 
terms, state-building is the activity of building or strengthening the institutions and 
infrastructure of a weak or failing state, typically by a foreign power. There are some 
common indicators that are lumped under the state-building i.e. peace-building, post 
conflict reconstruction, and long-term economic and political development. This process 
basically encompasses two different types of activities: reconstruction and development. 
Reconstruction refers to the restoration of war-torn or damaged societies to their pre-
conflict situation. While economic development refers to the creation of new institutions 
and the promotion of sustained economic growth, events that transform the society open-
endedly into something that it has not been previously (Fukuyama 2006: 4–5). 
There are three distinct aspects or phases to state-building. The first concerns 
what has come to be called post-conflict reconstruction and applies to countries emerging 
from violent conflict such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and Kosovo, where state authority has 
collapsed completely and needs to be rebuilt from the ground up. Here the issue for 
outside powers is the short-term provision of stability through infusions of security 
forces, police, humanitarian relief, and technical assistance to restore electricity, water, 
banking and payment systems, and so on. If the collapse state is lucky enough to achieve 
a modicum of stability with international help (as in the case of Bosnia), the second phase 
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comes into play. Here the chief objective is to create self-sustaining state institutions that 
can survive the withdrawal of outside intervention. The third phase has to do with the 
strengthening of weak states, where state authority exists in a reasonably stable form but 
cannot accomplish certain necessary state functions (Fukuyama 2005: 135–136). 
State-building is not just a creation of a monopoly over power in a territory; it is 
also to develop a particular form of authority that will fulfil specific, market-supporting 
tasks. The blurring of weak/failed/collapsed states means that this vision can be applied 
anywhere: whatever the problem, democratic state-building is the solution. The problem 
with this, of course, is that it telescopes state development, democratic development and 
market development into simultaneous, or near simultaneous, processes (Robinson 
2007: 13). 
The context in which the contemporary agenda for state-building has developed is 
the post-Cold War world. The evolving international system after the Cold War has both 
created the perceived need for state-building and has given state-building its particular, 
simplified character. The boundary between cause – what has lead to state-building’s 
increased prominence in international politics – and effect – what state-building is 
imagined to be in the theory and practice – is often not all that distinct (Robinson 2007: 
2–3). 
 
2.1. State-building vs. nation-building 
There is much confusion over the terms State-building and Nation Building both in the 
academic literature and political scenario. Some authors use these terms inter-changeably 
while others use with different meanings. Europeans often criticize Americans for the use 
of the term nation-building, reflecting as it does the specifically American experience of 
constructing a new political order in a land of new settlement without deeply rooted 
peoples, cultures, and traditions. Nations – that is to say, communities of shared values, 
traditions, and historical memory – by this argument are never built, particularly by 
outsiders; rather, they evolve out of an unplanned historical-revolutionary process. What 
Americans refer to as nation-building is rather state-building – that is, constructing 
political institutions, or else promoting economic development (Fukuyama 2006: 3). 
As Afghans are generally of the view that they have been a nation for centuries, 
therefore, the term state-building is usually used in order to remove any confusion. This 
refers to the developmental strategies to not only restore and rebuild the institutions and 
state apparatus to the pre-war level before the conflict began with the Soviet invasion in 
1979 but also to develop and sustain the security, and political and economic growth of 
the country. However, the post 9/11 US involvement in Afghanistan is highlighted in the 
paper from the perspective of state-building process.  
 
 
Ahmad Shah Azami: The Post-9/11 US-Led State-Building in Afghanistan 
 
4 
2.2. Components of state-building 
State-building is one of the most important issues for the international community 
because weak or failed states are the source of many of the world’s most serious 
problems, from poverty to AIDS to drugs and terrorism (Fukuyama 2005: xvii). Security 
is an essential precondition for a successful state-building. Money spent on infrastructure 
and development will be largely wasted if people, goods, and services are subjects to high 
level attacks. Soldiers are among the first elements of any state-building mission to arrive. 
Their first priority, however, should be to establish a modicum of security in what may be 
a chaotic situation. Once a minimal level of security has been established, the 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants should be the next 
priority. Armed units should be broken up, and individuals should be offered alternative 
livelihoods (Dobbins et al. 2007: xxiv–xxv). 
As regards physical infrastructure, the intervening authorities should give priority 
to fixing those related to security, finance, humanitarian aid, health care, education, 
power, water, and sanitation in an effort to raise these services to something approaching 
pre-war level (Dobbins et al. 2007: xxxiii). 
State-building intervention should leave behind a society at peace with itself and 
its neighbors. In this context, the process of democratization should be seen as a practical 
means of redirecting the ongoing competition for wealth and power within the society 
from violent into peaceful channels, not as an abstract exercise in social justice. National 
and local elections; the growth of civil society; the establishment of independent media; 
the development of political parties; and key state institutions such as military/police, 
judiciary and parliament needs to be ensued as part of state-building (Dobbins et al. 2007: 
xxxvi–xxxvii). 
 
3. US-led state-building in Afghanistan 
The US has led a number of state-building initiatives in various parts of the world for more 
than a century starting in Cuba from 1898 and followed by many other cases including 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Starting in 2001, the state-building in Afghanistan remains the US’ 
unfinished project. The early major goal of the US-led state-building efforts, in most cases, 
has been strategic.  In its first efforts, the US usually decided to replace or support a regime 
in a foreign land to defend its core security and economic interests, not to build a 
democracy. Only later did the US’ political ideals and its need to sustain domestic support 
for state-building abroad impel it to try to establish democratic rule in the target nations. 
The deployment of large number of US ground troops is the US’s second criterion of state-
building. The third criterion of American state-building is the use of U.S. military and civil 
personnel in the military and political administration of target countries (Pei, Amin and 
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Garz 2006: 64–65). Afghanistan, as a US state-building case study, lies in the third 
criterion. 
The post 9/11 US intervention in Afghanistan was the beginning of the US’ “War 
on Terror” rather than a humanitarian intervention. The US’ prime target was to defeat 
and dismantle the Al-Qaeda network and topple the Taliban regime which had provided 
safe havens to the former group. Part of the reason for the lack of interest in humanitarian 
intervention stemmed from the fact that, to a large extent, the issue was no longer should 
an intervention take place, but rather what should be done post-intervention. Hence, 
state-building replaced humanitarian intervention – the issue around which the debate 
regarding the merits, morality and legality of Western interventionism coalesced (Hehir 
2007: 186). Thus, the US state-building policy in Afghanistan was evidently secondary to 
the requirements of the military actions against al Qaeda and the remaining Taliban 
(Spanta 2005: 75). The US led state-building process had several shortcomings from the 
very beginning thus the paper has analyzed the US’ miscalculations and mistakes in 
Afghanistan from the perspective of three major components of state-building ranging 
from the security and peace to the democratization and the reconstructions & economic 
development. 
 
3.1. Security and peace 
State-building in Afghanistan is directly linked to stability, development and ensuring 
peace. Achieving peace requires an overall strategy that takes equal account of the 
elements of state-building, the economy, the social situation, the environment and peace. 
Any one-sided emphasis on a single component will create further problems now and for 
the future (Spanta 2005: 79). 
At the Group of Eight (G8) major donors’ conference in Geneva in April 2002, the 
Security Sector Reform agenda for Afghanistan was formally set with the establishment 
of the lead-nation system, which consisted of five pillars each led and supported by a 
major donor state. The US took on the role of building the Afghan National Army (ANA), 
while Germany became the lead nation for reconstructing the police force. Similarly, Italy 
became the lead country for judiciary, Japan for disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and the UK for counter-narcotics. However, no 
proper mechanism was established to harmonize the activities of the lead nations or to 
build synergies among them (Hodes and Sedra 2007: 52). 
There is no doubt that a mantra of nation-builders is “security first,” but in 
Afghanistan, too few troops on the ground pursuing a mission that was too narrowly 
defined (winning the global war on terror rather than fostering successful state-building) 
allowed various warlords, opium and heroin smugglers, retro- and neo-Taliban, Al-Qaeda, 
and other Islamist militants, as well as concomitant corruption to return (Goodson 2006: 
148–149). 
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A first rule of warfare is to know one’s enemy, his strengths and weaknesses, as 
well as his assets and liabilities. A second might be to know thyself: to frankly assess one’s 
biases and assumptions and to evaluate their impact on both goals and tactics. In 
Afghanistan, the US followed neither rule well (O’Connell 2017: 7–8). 
The state-building endeavors of the international players in Afghanistan also suffer 
from conceptional problems and do not display any uniform strategy. While the US makes 
its overall policy dependent on the military requirements of the war on terror – also 
seeking close cooperation with the warlords in this respect – and sees the state building 
project as pushing through the principles of a neoliberal market economy, the Europeans, 
especially Germany, place their faith mainly in the NGOs. This means that an attempt is 
being made to accomplish state-building with inappropriate instruments and players 
acting against each other. The declared goal of the international community is to 
strengthen the central government, enabling it to assert its monopoly of force throughout 
the country and carry out its responsibilities. However, its power is very limited, 
restricted primarily by that of the warlords, who are paradoxically supported by the US 
(Spanta 2005: 77). 
 
3.1.1. US’ support to warlords 
The US provided huge sums of money and weapons to the former mujahideen-turned 
warlords after 9/11 as part of its war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. 
The US assistance to Afghan warlords continued after the fall of the Taliban regime and 
the dismantling of the al-Qaeda network in the country. With the US’ support, these 
warlords, who had been defeated or expelled by the Taliban, came back to power after fall 
of the Taliban regime and started intimidating the people and corrupting the newly built 
state institutions. 
The anti-Taliban coalition of Afghan commanders was commonly known as the 
Northern Alliance (NA) due to its location and operation in the north of the country. 
General Tommy Franks, the then Commander-in-Chief of the United States Central 
Command (CENTCOM) writes in his book, American Soldier, that NA commanders were 
more than eager to work with the Americans. General Franks states: “Our plan hinged on 
combining these tough, highly motivated opposition fighters with the Coalition’s massive 
air power. To do so, however, we had to have a Special Forces team—Operational 
Detachments Alpha (ODA)—with each of the local Northern Alliance commanders.” 
(Franks 2004) 
After the death of the NA’s most powerful commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud, on 
9 September 2001, its leadership devolved on four tough, mutually suspicious 
commanders. Muhammad Fahim Khan, seconded by Bismillah Khan Mohammadi, headed 
the eastern Tajiks. Ismail Khan in the west (mainly Herat) commanded a second Tajik 
contingent. Abdul Rashid Dostum led the Uzbek militia. Karim Khalili and Mohammad 
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Mohaqiq ran the Hazara element. Together, they mustered around 20,000 fighters (Bolger 
2014: 41–42). 
On 27 September 2001, a CIA officer named Gary led ten paramilitary officers into 
Afghanistan and took with him $3 million in nonsequential $100 bills that he carried in a 
large steel suitcase. He would place bundles of cash in front of these anti-Taliban 
commanders and ask for their help in preparing the way for US Special Forces. He wanted 
the positions of enemy forces and intelligence on their communications, arms, and 
structure in exchange for money (Kessler 2003: 237). Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF), the official name given by the US government to its Global War on Terrorism in 
Afghanistan, started on 7 October, 2001. By 7 December 2001, it was almost all over. The 
CIA had spent $70 million on getting the NA commanders and a number of tribal elders to 
promote to Agency’s goals (Kessler 2003: 238–239). 
The coalition armed and funded Afghan commanders to seize and hold ground 
after the Taliban and al-Qaeda fled the U.S. air offensive. Some of these commanders used 
the money and arms they received to invest in drug production and engage in land grabs, 
predation, political intimidation, and ethnic retributions—a major source of insecurity for 
Afghans (Rubin 2013: 229). 
Warlordism was perhaps the most persistent challenge of the post-Taliban period 
in Afghanistan. As Zalmay Khalilzad, the former US envoy and later ambassador to 
Afghanistan during 2001-2005 writes in his book, The Envoy: From Kabul to the White 
House, My Journey Through a Turbulent World, that President Karzai vented with great 
emotion about the threat of warlordism. Karzai worried that as people tired of insecurity 
or oppression by their local strongmen, they might again welcome the Taliban or others 
who promised them justice and peace. The difficulty was that the United States was 
working with the warlords. The warlords had carried the burden of the ground campaign 
against the Taliban and al-Qaeda and, in the absence of anything like an effective national 
army, were still needed to take on the insurgents (Khalilzad 2016: 136–137). 
Then in Spring 2002, Pacha Khan Zadran, a tribal elder and warlord in 
Afghanistan’s eastern Paktia province had threatened President Karzai to launch a civil 
war if he was not recognized as the provincial governor by the central government. Karzai 
rejected his demand and issued an ultimatum to Zadran on 30 April to surrender or face 
the consequences. However, the US Department of Defense was apparently not ready to 
support Karzai against a local warlord. The US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sent 
a memo to President Bush and wrote that if Karzai could not prevail against local forces 
without American military assistance, he could not survive politically anyway. According 
to Rumsfeld: “I was convinced Karzai needed to learn to govern the Chicago way. In the 
1960s, Mayor Richard J. Daley ruled Chicago – a city of many diverse and powerful 
elements- using maneuver, guile, money, patronage, and services to keep the city’s 
fractious leaders from rebelling against his authority. President Bush agreed with my 
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recommendation, and I told Karzai he would have to resolve the dispute without the 
promise of rescue by the American military.” (Rumsfeld 2001: 407) 
US officials’ determination to legalize warlord authority against the wishes of the 
Afghan political leadership and general public was one of the most fatal mistakes he was 
to make in Afghanistan. Karzai considered Rumsfeld’s statement an insult to all Afghans, 
and from that time on, he saw the secretary of defense as being completely out of touch 
with reality. As the war continued, the Bush administration was faced with two policy 
choices. It was clear by the summer of 2002 that the warlords were becoming stronger 
while the Karzai regime lacked the resources to compete. The unstated US strategy was 
to leave Karzai ineffectual in the capital, protected by foreign forces, while relying on the 
warlords to keep Pax Americana in the countryside and the US Special Operation Forces 
(SOF) to hunt down al Qaeda. It was a minimalist, military intelligence-driven strategy 
that ignored nation-building, creating state institutions, or rebuilding the country’s 
shattered infrastructure. By following such a strategy, the United States left everything in 
place from the Taliban era except for the fact of regime change (Rashid 2008: 133). 
It gave the Taliban enough reasons to reorganize and launch an insurgency against 
the Afghan government and its international allies. In March 2002, disgruntled aid 
officials at the American embassy said that the CIA’s one billion US dollar budget was 
being used to pay off warlords and their militias, carry out quick-impact development 
projects, find al Qaeda leaders, and conduct classified operations against extremists. By 
the early summer 2002, 45,000 Afghan mercenaries were being paid by the CIA (Rashid 
2008: 135–136). 
The United Nations Special Representative for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi 
(2001–2004) wanted international troops rather than various militia forces to patrol 
Kabul and other major population centers. By contrast, Rumsfeld’s preference, which 
General Franks shared, was to continue to rely on the local warlords (Dobbins 2008: 128). 
According to Kai Eide, the UN’s Special Representative to Afghanistan and head of 
the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (2008–2010),  President 
Hamid Karzai’s lack of power instruments and limited financial resources, and the clear 
message from his powerful ally – the US – that Washington would not engage, meant that 
he would have to move with great care. Karzai himself was aware of this fact and said: 
“We understood that the West would not help us free Afghanistan from an environment 
of warlordism. On the contrary, some were promoted and allowed to keep their militias, 
to enrich themselves, and to intimidate Afghan villagers. That led to my first 
disappointment with the West after the fall of the Taliban.” (Eide 2014: 9)  
Gradually, they became more than warlords and military leaders. As foreign aid 
began to flow into the country – after a slow start – warlords and corrupt local leaders 
were the first to enrich themselves. Karzai added, “They formed contracting companies 
and received foreign contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars.” (Eide 2014: 9) 
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However, senior US officials and generals persisted in treating the warlords as the 
“heads of states”, inflating their egos even further. In September 2002 alone, The US 
Treasury Secretary, John Taylor, visited Ismail Khan (the former Mujahideen commander 
& the then Governor) in Herat; Under Secretary of defense and chief financial officer for 
the US Department of Defense Dov S. Zakheim met with Abdul Rashid Dostum (The Uzbek 
commander & the then Deputy Minister of Defense) and Atta Mohammad Noor (Tajik 
commander of Northern Alliance & the then Commander of 7th Corps of Northern 
Afghanistan) in Mazar, while Lt. Gen. Dan K. McNeill, the commander of US led Coalition 
forces, met with them all. In retrospect, the new US ambassador, Robert Finn, wondered 
if the U.S. could have done things differently: “We should have moved away from the 
warlords much earlier and we should have stopped visiting them. We should have 
supported the government more visibly. I stopped visiting Ismail Khan and Dostum, but 
Rumsfeld visited them several times.” (Rashid 2008: 142–143) 
 
3.1.2. Standing on two watermelons 
The US began another project in Iraq in 2003 when Afghan project was still in its 
beginning stages and was unfinished. This affected the state-building process, especially 
the security in Afghanistan. 
The Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq was not just a disaster for Iraq 
and for the US, it also diverted military and intelligence resources and aid experts from 
Afghanistan and allowed the Taliban to regroup and resume the war. Sadly, we will never 
know what might have happened had the US and NATO kept their eyes on the ball back in 
2003 (Walt 2014). The US’ neglect of Afghanistan from early 2003 allowed the Taliban to 
gradually seize control of key areas of the country, particularly in southern and eastern 
provinces (Zakheim 2011: 37). As it turned out, unlike Afghanistan, Iraq was not a “war 
of necessity” rather it was a “war of choice” for the US. In 2008, the then presidential 
candidate Barack Obama had run pledging to put Afghanistan back on course and win 
what many came to call “the good war,” in contrast to the disastrous war of choice in Iraq 
(Kerry 2018: 416). President Obama’s Secretary of State, John Kerry, described the 
invasion of Iraq as “the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time.” Kerry (2018: 
336) 
 
3.1.3. Taliban’s safe havens in Pakistan 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were the only three countries that 
had recognized the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Following the September 11 
attacks, and the subsequent War on Terror (WoT), Pakistan was pressurized by the US to 
either join them in their WoT or to be prepared to be bombed and sent back to the stone-
age (Synovitz 2006). Pakistan agreed to side with US and provided land routes, air space 
and other facilities to the US forces. Relations between Islamabad and Washington 
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strengthened after the US began pouring not only billions of dollars in aid to Pakistan but 
also naming it as a major non-NATO ally in 2002. 
After the US began Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on October 7, 2001 in 
Afghanistan, a large number of Taliban and Al-Qaeda commanders and the Al-Qaeda head, 
Osama Bin Laden, fled to neighboring Pakistan (Gall 2014: 61–62). The Pakistani spy 
agency ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) was accused of creating, supporting and financing 
various militant groups including the Taliban and LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba) and use them 
against neighbouring countries especially Afghanistan and India. As various US officials 
themselves noted later, after 9/11, the ISI continued clandestine partnership with such 
groups while simultaneously assisting the US (Woodward 2010: 89). 
The ISI helped the Afghan Taliban to reorganize and pushed them to go and fight 
inside Afghanistan. First hand interviews and eyewitness accounts say that ISI officials 
were threatening former fighters and commanders and their families with arrest, telling 
them that they would be handed over to the Americans and sent to Guantanamo Bay if 
they did not start an insurgency in Afghanistan (Gall 2014: 74). Even as the evidence 
mounted, neither President Bush nor any of the principals in the US administration were 
willing to acknowledge, much less act on, evidence of Pakistan’s double game (Khalilzad 
2016: 183–184). 
The US Secretary of State Robert Gates writes in his book Duty: Memoirs of a 
Secretary at War that while the US was preoccupied with Iraq between 2002 and 2005, 
the Taliban reconstituted in western Pakistan and in southern and eastern Afghanistan. 
He writes: “Commander of ISAF General David McKiernan had been on ground in 
Afghanistan less than three months when I met with him in Kabul in 2008. He told me that 
if he could take care of the safe havens in Pakistan, “we could secure Afghanistan in six 
months.” Gates (2014: 217) 
A highly classified report on Afghanistan in 2007 by US Army Lieutenant General 
Douglas Lute identified Pakistan as a much more strategically troubling problem than 
Afghanistan, because the sanctuaries there for al Qaeda and other affiliate groups were 
more of a threat to the US (Woodward 2010: 43). 
Pakistan always wanted to benefit itself of the circumstances ongoing in 
Afghanistan. If the Americans stayed, Pakistan would enjoy control of the US supply 
conduit, earning money and exerting pressure as needed. If the Americans left, as 
Islamabad leaders suspected they would, then Pakistan’s keeping good relations with the 
Taliban ensured its influence in Afghanistan when Karzai’s regime succumbed (Bolger 
2014: 367). Robert Gates says he knew that they [Pakistan] were really no ally at all (Gates 
2014: 477), 
Richard Holbrooke, the US Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(2009–2010) often said that the true key to ending the war was to change Pakistan (Nasr 
2013). 
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After travelling thousands of miles and meeting several times with the then 
Pakistan’s military chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen also came to the conclusion that the Pakistani military chief 
used to deceive him each time and had no intention to abandon the proxies. About to retire 
in 2011, Mullen told a US Senate penal that Pakistan was supporting the Taliban’s Quetta 
Shura and the Haqqani network despite getting aid from the US. “The actions by the 
Pakistani government to support them – actively and passively – represent a growing 
problem that is undermining US interests and may violate international norms, 
potentially warranting sanctions.” (Gall 2014: 261) 
Unable to secure reliable, large-scale Pakistani cooperation, the Americans 
resorted to drone strikes and some SOF missions by the CIA and the Task Force, 
culminating in the May 2, 2011, raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan’s garrison 
city of Abbotabad (Bolger 2014: 368). Later the Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Muhammad 
Mansour was also killed in a US drone strike in the southwest Pakistan in 2016 (BBC 
2016). 
As former Pakistani ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani noted, the $21 billion 
in funding under the Obama administration could not change Pakistan, just as $12.4 
billion given to Pakistan under the Bush administration failed to shut down its terrorism 
incubators. Haqqani (2016) Looking at the behavior of Pakistan, the US President Donald 
Trump also came forward and criticized its partnership with the United States and its role 
in the war on terror in his first tweet of 2018: “The United States has foolishly given 
Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given 
us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the 
terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!” (Trump 2018) 
 
3.1.4. Civilian casualties and disregarding the local culture 
As Gates says, long before issues such as civilian casualties in US air strikes, the actions of 
private security contractors and intimidation of local population, night raids mainly 
conducted by the CIA, and disrespecting local traditions and cultural norms prompted 
President Karzai to repeatedly and publically condemn the US, he had regularly raised 
these matters in private but the Americans were far too slow in picking up on these signals 
and taking actions (Gates 2014: 201). 
One of the earliest major events of civilian casualties was reported on June 30, 
2002 when the US-led coalition forces bombed a wedding ceremony in Afghanistan’s 
southern Uruzgan province which killed 48 civilians including women and children and 
wounded more than 100. Later several other wedding ceremonies were also bombed by 
the US forces (Engelhardt 2013). 
Apart from several other like-wise incidents, the US faced much criticism after a 
NATO airstrike on the evening of 17 February 2011 in the Ghaziabad district of eastern 
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Kunar province killed 65 civilians, including a number of children. Though NATO 
admitted that some civilians may have been wounded, it claimed the airstrike targeted 
combatants. When the issue was raised in a meeting with Karzai and other Afghan officials 
at the presidential palace, top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan General David 
Petraeus suggested that Afghans caught up in this attack might have burned their own 
children to exaggerate claims of civilian casualties. Several Afghan officials present, 
including Karzai took his comments to be a grave insult to the Afghans. Reacting to 
General Patraeus’ statement, An Afghan official said, “Killing 60 people, and then blaming 
the killing on those same people, rather than apologizing for any deaths? This is inhuman. 
This is a really terrible situation.” (Partlow 2011) 
Apart from several other incidents of civilian casualties, the killing of men, women 
and children in a village in Afghanistan’s southern Kandahar province shocked and 
angered the Afghans. A US soldier named Robert Bale, killed 16 civilians including women 
and children and wounded five others on March 11, 2012 in Panjwai district of Kandahar 
province after entering homes of villagers. Locals told the media that he had also set on 
fire the dead bodies of male villagers before leaving for his base. This incident occurred a 
month after the anti-US sentiments were already high in Afghanistan after US soldiers 
burnt copies of the Muslims’ holy book, the Quran (BBC 2012). 
US airstrikes targeting civilians became a regular phenomenon. The frustration 
among the population was growing further. Karzai began to complain that the US/NATO 
were targeting the Afghan public but ignore to take any action against what he called the 
source and training camps on militants which he said were in Pakistan. As the dispute 
between Karzai and the US over civilian casualties grew, the United Nations began 
gathering data and information about civilian casualties and produced reports that 
showed much higher casualty rates than the US-led military coalition was acknowledging 
(Gall 2014: 103). 
 The US Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald E. Neumann (2005–2007) says that 
another persistent problem was the failure of Americans to listen to the people they were 
attempting to influence: “I saw an increasing blindness among American policymakers to 
how US policies appeared to Afghans and a concomitant deafness toward Afghan 
concerns. During my 2010 trip to Afghanistan, I heard regular refrains from American 
officials and soldiers in the field that Kabul doesn’t matter.” (Neumann 2017: 63–64) 
The US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is of the same opinion and highlights the 
US mistakes: “Our troops were not always as respectful of Afghans as they should have 
been, including our vehicles barreling down the roads scattering pedestrians and animals. 
I heard, anecdotally, about an Afghan elder who showed up at the gate of the main 
coalition base in Kandahar to complain about some insult to his family by troops. He was 
ignored for three days, returned home – and his three sons then joined the Taliban…. I 
knew that some abusive and insulting behavior by troops was inevitable.” (Gates 2014: 
219) 
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3.1.5. Lack of coordination 
The US policies were fluctuating not only due to politics at home but also lack of 
coordination among key US government intuitions such as the Pentagon, White House and 
State Department contributed to the failure of the mission. One of the most prevalent 
characteristics among senior policy makers in Washington is a complete inattention to 
the details of implementing policy in Afghanistan. As several US officials and observers 
have noted, below the level of the president, no agency, department or institution could 
even agree on who was in charge of the war. (Neumann 2017: 44–45) Just within the 
Pentagon and the Joint Staff, a plethora of offices under different generals and assistant 
secretaries competed by direction of the war (Ballard, Lamm and Wood 2012: 181–182). 
The US Secretary of State Robert Gates writes in his book Duty: Memoirs of a 
Secretary at War that there was a divide over Afghanistan from time to time between State 
and Defense on one hand and the White House and the National Security Strategy on the 
other. “During my tenure as secretary (2006–2011), there were three US ambassadors to 
Kabul; none did well. Even Secretary [of State Hillary] Clinton would speak of [Karl] 
Eikenberry’s insubordination, that he would not do what she directed. Though both 
Clinton and I wanted Eikenberry replaced – because his relationship with [Afghan 
President Hamid] Karzai was beyond repair and his relationships with both Defense and 
State were so poor – and repeatedly told [the National Security Advisor Jim] Jones so, the 
ambassador was protected by the White House.” (Gates 2014: 371) 
The US funding policy to Afghanistan was carried out both by the US Department 
of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD) but both of them rarely coordinated their 
efforts. The DoD comptroller for Afghan funding Dov S. Zakheim later said he didn’t know 
that DoS had designated Richard Haass for a similar role (Zakheim 2011: 173). 
On political side too, when the Obama administration took over, the atmosphere 
deteriorated dramatically. The newly elected President sent his Vice President-elect, Joe 
Biden, to Kabul in January 2009 before the inauguration. Biden told Karzai that Pakistan 
was 50 times more important to the US than Afghanistan, a statement that offended the 
Afghan president and increased his suspicion of US intentions (Eide 2014: 28). 
The White House had an upper hand in Afghan policies and was not much 
entertaining the recommendations of the Department of State (DoS). Sometimes, it was 
even bypassing the DoS officials. The US ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, in 
particular became a handful for the DoS. In November 2010, President Obama and 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went to Lisbon for a NATO summit, planning to meet 
with Karzai there. When Eikenberry asked to go as well, Clinton turned down his request 
and instructed him to stay in Kabul. He ignored her and showed up in Lisbon (Nasr 2013). 
The American newspaper, Washington Post, in December 2019, through a three-
year long legal battle, received hundreds of confidential interviews with key figures 
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involved in prosecuting the 18-year US war in Afghanistan. The 2,000 pages of documents 
known as “Afghanistan Papers” reveal that the senior US officials failed to tell the truth 
about the war in Afghanistan and US public has been consistently misled about an 
unwinnable conflict (Washington Post 2019). 
 
3.1.6. Downgrading diplomacy and reconciliation 
Ending the war and building a functioning Afghan government required a reconciliation 
process that would integrate the Taliban back into the Afghan political community. 
However, the US didn’t get serious about a peace process until it was too late. As U.S. 
special envoy for Afghanistan, James Dobbins later acknowledged that it was a mistake to 
delay a serious effort at reconciliation. The US also failed to engage regional powers that 
might have helped put together a stabilization deal, in part because it wasn’t even talking 
to some of them (e.g., Iran) (Walt 2014). 
Soon after their regime was toppled, several high-level Taliban leaders offered to 
withdraw from political life in exchange for immunity but US turned a deaf ear to their 
request. President Karzai also favored the Taliban’s offer but the Pentagon was against it 
and continued to kill or capture them and raided their houses across the country. To 
complicate Karzai’s efforts further, the US blocked the reintegration of key Taliban leaders 
who wanted to stop fighting. Many of these Taliban members, who had been rejected, 
subsequently played crucial roles in the return of the Taliban (Abbas 2014: 81). 
But the US military thought talk of reconciliation undermined America’s 
commitment to fully resourced COIN. On his last trip to Afghanistan, in October 2010, 
Richard Holbrooke (who was appointed as the US’ special representative 
for Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2009) pulled aside General David Petraeus (the top US 
commander in Afghanistan) and said, “David, I want to talk to you about reconciliation.” 
“That’s a 15-second conversation,” Petraeus replied. “No, not now.” (Nasr 2013) 
On the other hand, Pakistan’s cooperation was also absent. Pakistani authorities 
detained several dozen Pakistan based Afghan Taliban leaders that President Karzai’s 
government was trying to reconcile. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, often described as 
Mullah Omar’s second-in-command, was the most prominent among them. He was seized 
in early 2010 in a joint US-Pakistan operation and was kept in prison for more than eight 
years before releasing him in late 2019 (Gall 2014: 161). 
The first serious sign of US’ willing to talk to the Taliban was given in February 
2011 when the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed US’ readiness to talk to the 
insurgent group (Coll 2018: 562–563). The Taliban were earlier reluctant to talk to the 
Afghan government but later agreed that following US-Taliban talks, the group will sit 
with the Afghan government. President Karzai approved the establishment of an office for 
the Taliban in Doha. However, when the Taliban office was about to be opened officially 
in June 2013, Karzai insisted that it should not become an instrument for the Taliban to 
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obtain any form of international recognition. He said he had received written assurances 
from President Obama that this would not be the case. When the Taliban representatives 
held their opening press conference, however, it was in front of their old flag – the flag of 
the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. “The Office of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” was 
inscribed on a plate on the front wall of the Taliban’s office in Doha. To Karzai it was an 
unacceptable breach of confidence. Thus, the office was shut down after Karzai’s protest. 
He blamed the US for what happened in Doha (Eide 2014: 31). 
However, many years later, the President Donald Trump administration began 
peace talks with the Taliban in Doha, Qatar, in October 2018, aimed at resolving the 
Afghan conflict peacefully and finally signed a peace agreement on February 29, 2020 (US 
Department of State 2020). The agreement set a timeline of 14 months for the withdrawal 
of all US and NATO troops from Afghanistan and in return a Taliban guarantee that Afghan 
soil will not be used as a launchpad that would threaten the security of the US and its 
allies. The agreement also stated the launch of intra-Afghan negotiations by March 10, 
2020 and a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire. 
 
3.2. Democratization 
Democracy in general is a form of government where there is “rule of the people, by the 
people and for the people”. It was the Greeks who coined the term democracy, or 
demokratia, from the Greek word demos, the people, and kratos, to rule (Dahl 2000: 11). 
For people in the West, democracy means “liberal democracy”; a political system marked 
not only by free and fair elections but also by the rule of law, separation of powers, and 
the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and the right to own 
property (Zakaria 2003: 17). Ever since September 11, 2001 and the subsequent “war on 
terror”, promoting democracy has returned forcefully to the foreign policy agenda of the 
United States (Bogdandy, Wolfrum and Philipp 2005: 592). 
At a time when Operation Enduring Freedom was in its beginner stages, the United 
Nations convened a conference in Bonn, Germany, from 27 November to 5 December 
2001 on the future of Afghanistan. The decision was made in the conference that 16 of the 
29 ministries in the interim government would be given to members of the “Northern 
Alliance” while Hamid Karzai would preside as head of the interim government. The NA 
did retain control over the ministries of Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs among 
others (Khalilzad 2016: 127). The new settlement was somehow in contrary with 
President Bush remarks to the National Security Council meeting on November 12, 2001 
that “Politically, we need to send a signal that the Northern Alliance will not run post-
Taliban Afghanistan.” (Woodward 2002: 306) 
Hamid Karzai was sworn in as the head of the interim Afghan administration on 
22 December 2001 for a period of six months while he was elected as President for two 
years transitional set up by the traditional Loya Jirga (grand assembly/council) in Kabul 
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on 13 June 2002. Later, he won the race in the first-ever direct presidential elections of 
Afghanistan in October 2004 and was elected for the term of five years. The very next year, 
on September 18, 2005, parliamentary elections were held for the Wolesi Jirga (House of 
the People) or the Lower House and Provincial Councils. After the completion of first 5-
year-tenure of Afghan Presidency, presidential elections were held again in 2009, 2014 
and 2019 respectively while parliamentary elections were only held in 2010 and 2018 
respectively. 
On the recommendations of the 2001 Bonn Agreement on Afghanistan, the 
Constitutional Loya Jirga, which comprised 502 Afghan elders and local dignitaries met 
for three weeks in Kabul and approved the final draft of the Constitution on 04 January 
2004. The 2004 Constitution was mostly based on the 1964 constitution and consisted of 
12 titles and 160 articles. Although the Afghan constitution includes almost all features of 
democracy, the act on all of them are yet to be done. 
In 2009, the Afghan constitution required that the presidential election be held by 
May 22, when Karzai’s term would legally end, but the US and its coalition partners were 
pressing hard to postpone the election to August to August 20. The US Special Envoy for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke argued that a May election could undermine 
the opposition’s ability to compete and ISAF’s ability to provide security. During the 
National Security Council meeting on February 13, for Holbrooke and others at the table, 
it provided the time necessary to identify a viable alternative to Karzai, who they thought 
had to go. If the Afghan constitution was an impediment to achieving this goal, the hell 
with it (Gates 2014: 340–341). 
Holbrooke was doing his best to bring about the defeat of Karzai in the August 20 
elections. What he really wanted was to have enough credible candidates running to deny 
Karzai a majority in the election, thus forcing a runoff in which he could be defeated. 
Unlike the 2004 Afghan presidential election, when the US offered Karzai unqualified 
support, in the months leading up to the 2009 election, our public position was one of 
neutrality among the candidates. But Holbrooke and US ambassador to Afghanistan Karl 
Eikenberry were encouraging the other candidates, meeting and being photographed 
with them, attending their rallies, and making suggestions (Gates 2014: 358). 
Later in 2014 run off presidential elections between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah 
Abdullah, each side accused the other of widespread rigging. Both were claiming victory 
ahead of results which needed to be announced by the Independent Election Commission 
of Afghanistan. In order to prevent unpleasant circumstances and tensions in the country 
by the Abdullah team, the then US Secretary of State John Kerry bypassed the Afghan 
constitution to announce the future set-up for the country. Kerry writes in his book Every 
Day is Extra that they were nearing a critical moment in the negotiations when, in a 
surprise move, Ghani picked up on the idea of forming a unity government. In contrary to 
make them obey the law and procedures and waiting for the announcement of results by 
Central European Journal of Politics 
Volume 6 (2020), Issue 1, pp. 1–25 
17 
the election commission, Kerry formed the first-ever National Unity Government of 
Afghanistan. 
I then turned to Ghani, put my hand on his shoulder and said, “Ashraf, you are going 
to be president. Abdullah will help you implement a common agenda. But you have to be 
willing to transfer real power to him and give him the opportunity share in governance, 
because it is in the interest of the country.” (Kerry 2018: 422) 
Thus, it was a 50-50 government run by Ashraf Ghani along with his two vice 
presidents and Abdullah Abdullah along with his two chief executives. Chief Executive 
was a newly-created role for Abdullah with prime ministerial powers which didn’t have 
place in the Afghan constitution. This was an unsuccessful experience as both leaders 
carried on their differences and controversies throughout their five-year tenure till 2019. 
This also affected several decision-making processes and developments in the country. 
Each one had due shares in federal ministries, provincial offices and foreign missions. 
The former Afghan President Hamid Karzai had told his aides that the US 
administration (Richard Holbrooke and Karl Eikenberry) also took several tactical 
measures and inserted pressure to make him share the government with his run-mate 
Abdullah Abdullah in 2014 presidential elections but he stood fast and turned a deaf ear 
to them. 
A number of Afghans think that democracy is an externally imposed liberal and 
non-Islamic phenomenon. Some of them view some elements of the current process of 
democratization are similar to the reforms imposed after the 1978 communist coup by 
the Soviet backed regime. They consider democracy as an alien concept which poses a 
danger not only to their religious beliefs but also to their traditions and cultural values. 
Democratization has, however, become the best global practice for international state-
building interventions, and yet in Afghanistan, democracy now carries negative 
connotations for many people (Larson 2011: 11). 
There is still space for the development of democracy in Afghanistan. Democracy 
can flourish in peace and development, therefore, a renewed focus on peace-building 
economic development is required. The locals need to be on board and they need to see 
the benefits f economic aid. 
The institutions of “Assembly Democracy” existed around 2500 BC in the Middle 
East, Greece and Rome, and Afghanistan’s traditional Jirga is the best example of it in the 
contemporary history. (Kean 2009: xv) Lessons from local Afghan culture and traditions 
will also prove helpful as they contain a lot of aspects of democracy. Afghanistan has a 
long history of Jirgas (Elders’ Councils) and Loya Jirgas (Grand Councils) which have 
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3.3. Reconstruction and economic development 
The World Bank estimates that between 1978, when the Communist coup took place, and 
November 2001, when the Taliban were overthrown, Afghanistan lost $240 billion in 
ruined infrastructure and vanished opportunities (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 75). 
Soon after the Bonn Agreement, an international donors’ conference was held in 
Tokyo in January 2002, where out of $5 billion raised, the US pledged only $290 million 
for one year while the promised aid from other countries was often intended to be spread 
over a longer period. The US approach led other governments to lowball their 
contributions as well. While $5 billion may sound like a great deal, it is less so when one 
divides it among more than 25 million (now 35 million) impoverished Afghans. In their 
first year of reconstruction, Bosnians received 16 times more international assistance 
than Afghans, while Kosovars received eight times more (Dobbins 2008: 120). 
Between FYs 2003 and 2004, spending by the US Congress for assistance for 
Afghanistan went from $740 million to $1.9 billion, most of the latter in a supplemental 
appropriation. With donors at the Tokyo conference having failed to deliver fully on their 
pledges, a second conference was convened in Berlin in March-April 2004 where $8.2 
billion in bilateral aid was committed for the year 2004–2006, of which $4.5 billion was 
promised up-front in 2004. For the full period, the US pledged $2.9 billion in non-military 
assistance (Weinbaum 2005: 170). 
It was the inaction, the sheer stubbornness, of the White House’s Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) leadership that resulted in America’s denying sufficient 
and critical economic assistance to Afghanistan during 2002 and 2003. While American 
forces were still cleaning the Taliban out of southern Afghanistan, OMB was negotiating 
with State over how much assistance should be requested from Congress for that country. 
Had OBM provided the government in Kabul with what the US would later spend on Iraq 
in just one week - $3 billion – Afghan farmers might have been given, and then chosen, 
alternatives to poppy production as the war wound down; critical roads linking the 
country could have been completed in a matter of a year or two, and consequent economic 
growth might have helped pull the country together and more effectively thwart a Taliban 
resurgence (Zakheim 2011: 285–286). 
The then US Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neumann saw that the US draft 
budget for 2006 added only $37 million for road programmes (Neumann 2009: 39–40, 
50) Half-hearted and only modest international engagement in building Afghan 
institutions limited President Karzai’s ability to project power and deliver services to the 
Afghan people (Eide 2014: 7). Meanwhile, the Afghan government’s ‘Donor Financial 
Review’ at the end of 2009 raised the problem of donors bypassing the Afghan authorities. 
According to the review, the international community has pledged to provide USD 62 
billion in assistance to Afghanistan between 2001 and 2009. Based on available 
information, 77% ($29 billion) of the actually spend amount ($36 billion) has been 
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disbursed on projects and programs designed and implemented by the donors themselves 
with little or no input by the Government of Afghanistan. The remaining development 
assistance ($8.7 billion) has been delivered directly through the treasury of the 
Government of Afghanistan using the national budget, but of this amount, only $770 
million has been placed fully at the discretion of the Government of Afghanistan to 
determine where it will be allocated and spent (Donor Financial Review 2009: 1). 
In addition to bypassing, the lack of US authorities’ communication and 
coordination with Afghans consistently hindered the state-building project in Afghanistan 
(Gates 2014: 359). 
In Afghanistan in 2002, World Bank and UN officials insisted that the government 
should not invest in higher education and moreover should invest very little in secondary 
and vocational education despite the fact that Afghanistan had seen its professional class 
decimated by war, disease, and flight. Citing the focus of the millennium development 
goals (MDGs) on primary education, they considered higher education and vocational 
training a luxury that Afghanistan could ill afford. But without training doctors, teachers, 
engineers, and managers, it was not clear at the time whether Afghanistan could get back 
on its feet. Five years later, the fact that the country’s operational budget is overshadowed 
by the cost for technical assistance to make up for the “poor capacity” of the government 
testifies to the debilitating expense of failure to invest in the training of professional staff, 
future leaders, and administrators (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 142). 
Moreover, having promised the government of Afghanistan that it would build 
several hundred schools (and in one meeting USAID said that it would build eleven 
hundred schools within two years), it asked other actors to discontinue their programs. 
However, the agency ended up building only eight school buildings within this time 
frame—of which six have already collapsed. The costs are not just financial but can also 
be measured in terms of loss of trust and hope, which are far more significant. Afghan 
citizens interviewed in the spring of 2007 expressed their sense of betrayal by the 
international community because of the waste, inefficiency, and corruption (Ghani and 
Lockhart 2008: 95). 
British author and journalist Jack Fairweather points to the plan to repair the 
Kajaki hydroelectric dam in country’s southern Helmand province as a specific example 
of the lack of communication between the various organizations attempting to rebuild 
Afghanistan. In 2003, the new US ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalizad, slated $20 
million to study the repairs that would be necessary for the dam, with the repairs 
themselves estimated to amount to $125 million. Unbeknownst to the Americans, the new 
finance minister (and current president) of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, had already 
conducted a study on the necessary repairs and found that they would cost only $500,000 
(Fairweather 2014: 101). 
The US and UN spent each time hundreds of millions of dollars during both 
presidential and parliamentary elections since 2004. Had this process been electronic or 
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biometric, it would not only save money but also prevent fraud and rigging in elections.  
Thousands of people registered to vote multiple times and acknowledged to the press that 
they had voted more than once in 2004 presidential elections. The same process was 
repeated during the parliamentary elections in 2005 at a cost of approximately $400 
million. The alternative electronic system could have been put in place for $140 million 
and would have generated an estimated $80 million in its first year by issuing passports, 
drivers’ licenses, and identity cards (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 78). Although partial 
biometric process was adopted during parliamentary elections in 2018 and presidential 
elections in 2019, it had several shortcomings and technical problems. 
Despite its good intentions, the “aid system” evidently suffers from an inherent 
resistance to transparency and accountability and often cannot provide coherent advice 
and solutions to national governments. The US reconstruction policy lacked coordination 
and appeared ineffective. Despite a desire to bolster the central government, Washington 
was reconciled to having NGOs as the main conduits for aid (Weinbaum 2005: 168). As 
witnessed in many parts of the world, resources for necessary long-term undertakings 
are used by NGOs for projects with a short time span. Larger projects of particular 
importance for the national economy – road-building, education, healthcare, dam 
construction, power stations and mining projects – have up to now been the classic 
responsibilities of the state. As long as the NGOs spend most of the reconstruction funding 
on their small and local projects, the country’s devastated infrastructure will remain weak 
or dysfunctional (Spanta 2005: 77). 
When the international donor conference took place in Paris in June 2008, the US 
refused to include in the concluding statement a specific commitment that the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ran by foreign military forces would provide the Afghan 
government with information on their activities. President Karzai said in reaction to it 
that any mention of the PRTs in an international context of this nature was unacceptable 
(Eide 2014: 17). 
PRTs were small, civilian-military units that aimed to assist provincial and local 
governments to govern more effectively and deliver essential services. There were 26 
PRTs in Afghanistan, 12 of which were under US command, and 13 other coalition 
countries were leading the rest. President Karzai frequently urged the allied governments 
to stop using private security companies, contending that they, along with PRTs - the 
civilian-military reconstruction teams, were an impediment to the central government’s 
expanding its authority throughout the country. To an audience of foreign ministers and 
defense experts attending the annual Munich Security Conference in 2011 Karzai said that 
his administration did not want any competing parallel structures: “It prevents the 
growth of the Afghan government and they provide a challenge to the Afghan government. 
Their role confuses people — they ask who is in charge. As the Afghan government takes 
more responsibility and relieves you of the burdens and responsibilities, the parallel 
structures should be ended.” (Dempsey 2011) 
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The Afghan government’s ‘Donor Financial Review’ of 2009 revealed that only 15 
out of 34 donor countries provided complete data of their assistance. The US was among 
those that provided incomplete data (Donor Financial Review 2009: 6). Most of the 
donors in Afghanistan including the US spent a big portion of funds on international 
salaries, luxury cars and chartered airplanes. A foreign consultant who was hired to work 
in the Afghan Ministry of Finance said that he received a salary of $22,000 per month and 
that there were consultants who were receiving even higher salaries (Eide 2014: 20–21). 
Building a new Afghan state and fighting a counterinsurgency war required 
outsiders to pour billions of dollars into an impoverished country, but the flood of poorly 
managed money merely fueled corruption and ensured that much of the aid money 
was wasted (Walt 2014). Usually the Afghan officials are blamed for corruption. However, 
the former Afghan President Hamid Karzai blames the US for encouraging a culture of 
corruption in Afghanistan through spending hundreds of millions of dollars over the past 
two decades without accountability. In an interview with the Associated Press on 10 
December 2019, Karzai responded to findings from a trove of documents which revealed 
that successive US administrations misled the US public about the war in Afghanistan 
(Gannon 2019). 
The cumulative appropriations for reconstruction and related activities in 
Afghanistan between FY 2002–2019 totaled approximately $132.6 billion. The amount 
provided to the nine largest active U.S. funds represents more than 86.1% (nearly 
$114.17 billion) of total reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan since FY 2002. Of this 
amount, over 92.9% (nearly $106.11 billion) has been obligated, and nearly 89.2% 
(nearly $101.80 billion) has been disbursed. An estimated $5.80 billion of the amount 
appropriated for these funds has expired and will therefore not be disbursed. As of 
September 30, 2019, cumulative appropriations for reconstruction and related activities 
in Afghanistan totaled approximately $132.55 billion. This total can be divided into four 
major categories of reconstruction and related funding: security, governance and 
development, humanitarian, and oversight and operations. Approximately $8.94 billion of 
these funds support counternarcotics initiatives that crosscut the security ($4.57 billion) 
and governance and development ($4.37 billion) categories. The Department of Defense 
reported in its latest “Cost of War Report,” dated June 30, 2019, that cumulative 
obligations for Afghanistan including warfighting had reached $764.5 billion. The cost of 
Afghanistan reconstruction equaled 16% of this amount at that date (SIGAR 2019: 46). 
In hindsight, it seems that most of those dollars did not produce enduring and 
sustainable gains due to mismanagement, non-coordination, unnecessary projects, and 
militarizing the development agenda, etc. (Coster 2017: 186). 
Four reasons may be identified why attempts at state-building fail. First, the 
resources made available have been insufficient. Second, donor policies have been 
hampered by a lack of knowledge of local conditions and unwillingness to adapt policies 
to local context. Third, the model of state-building on which the effort has been based has 
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been flawed and contradictory. And fourth, the attempts at state-building have run 
counter to the interests of key domestic actors (Eriksen n.d.: 1). In the case of Afghanistan, 
the US made all of the above mistakes.  
 
Conclusion 
In 2001, state-building was not the priority of the US and its coalition partners in 
Afghanistan. However, security and peace-building in the country should have been the 
outcome of their “War on Terror”. They intervened in Afghanistan to dismantle Al-Qaeda 
and topple the Taliban regime as part of their policy to secure their own homelands. Later, 
when the US began the state-building agenda in Afghanistan, it had very limited success. 
The US state-building process empowered a variety of warlords by financing them and 
helping them get key military and political positions. This act not only affected the security 
and peace but also paved way to chaos and rights violations. Had the US strengthened the 
Afghan central government and supported it in the implementation of the rule of law, the 
state-building initiative would have had a much better outcome and implications not only 
on security sector but also on good governance, democratization and economic 
development. 
The building of security institutions and demobilization of formal and informal 
private militias were an antidote of a successful political set up. However, the 
inconsistency in economic aid, military and civilian surge, lack of coordination among 
various US institutions involved in Afghanistan and bypassing the local government and 
local elders on policy priorities and implementation were among the other drawbacks in 
the state-building process. Getting locals on board and implementing cohesive and 
coordinated economic, military and political policies would have brought the much more 
success in Afghanistan.  
Apart from turning a deaf ear to the Afghan concerns, civilian casualties and 
disregarding the Afghan culture; the low footprint; not addressing the issue of terrorists’ 
sanctuaries; and ignoring the reconciliation with the Taliban were some other reasons 
that made Afghanistan the longest war in US’ history. As a result, the US, on one hand, 
through its policies during the past over 18 years of presence in Afghanistan could not 
achieve its desired goals to bring peace and security, a successful process of 
democratization and an economically stable Afghanistan, and on the other hand, it could 
not win the hearts and minds of local Afghans. 
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